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**THE ROMANIAN VECTOR OF THE ACTIVITY OF THE OUN'S
CARPATHIAN AREA (THE 1940s – BEGINNING OF THE 1950s): ON THE
COOPERATION OF THE UKRAINIAN AND ROMANIAN
UNDERGROUND**

– *Abstract* –

In this article, on the basis of some unknown and little-known archival documents, the features of the activity of the Karpatskyi krai (the Carpathian area) of the OUN, aiming at making good contacts with Romanian anticommunist movement in the 1940s – beginning of the 1950s, are clarified. A dozen of descriptions of the propaganda raids into the territory of Romania, staged by Ukrainian nationalists, with the mission of rendering objective truth about the OUN and UPA and also of attracting members of Romanian underground into the common struggle, are described. It is proved that such raids had a powerful effect, at least by forming an objective representation about the Ukrainian liberation movement and demonstrating the possibility to struggle against the Soviet totalitarianism.

Keywords: Romania, Ukraine, Karpatskyi krai (the Carpathian area), OUN, anticommunist resistance.

OUN's foreign-policy activity, which, during the Second World War changed cardinally – from the orientation toward some great state or a group of such states to the foundation of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations) (ABN) and attraction of all the enslaved peoples into the common struggle, is a key element of the concept of the OUN's national revolution. Considering the struggle of the Ukrainian people as a component of the all-European anti-totalitarian resistance movement, the Ukrainian nationalists tried to prove that the victory over the Bolshevism was possible only on condition of common efforts of all the oppressed peoples. Carrying out the concept of a national-liberation revolution and having created the national departments of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), in the years of the Second

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World War it became possible to involve the peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia into the struggle. No doubt, all that was preceded by a long and carefully thought-over work among the representatives of different peoples. Propaganda raids became one of the forms of this work. The appearance of the Ukrainian insurgents in the territories of the neighboring states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania) became a bright demonstration of Ukrainian feelings and refuted a long chain of myths created by the Soviet propaganda, such as “the image of the Ukrainian nationalist-criminal”, absence of any resistance to the Soviets and impossibility of struggling with them, etc. In other words, the pictorial example of the carriers of ideas of the Ukrainian nationalism became the best propaganda for the population of the neighboring states.

The main part of this work is based on the Karpatskyi krai (the Carpathian area) of the OUN. It was one of the strongest and largest regions and functioned during the longest time from among the other areas of the Organization of Ukrainian nationalists (OUN). In geographically terms, the Karpatskyi krai covered the present-day Transcarpathia, Ivano-Frankivsk (without Rohatyn and the northern part of Halych districts), Chernivtsi and the southern part of Lviv regions (Drohobych, Skoliv, Stryi, and Turka districts, the southwest part of Mykolaïv district and central and southern parts of Sambir district). In 1945 it covered the territory with the area of 38.4 thousands of sq. km, in 1947 – 31.6 thousands of sq. km, in 1948 – 29.8 thousands of sq. km, in 1950 – 28.8 thousands of sq. km. In 1950 the population in territory of Karpatskyi krai made up to 2.2 million people. A whole spectrum of typical signs was characteristic of it, as well as of other OUN areas, but it and its territorial units also had the unique inherent features. The Karpatskyi krai also carried out a chain of special tasks: it was the base of the OUN Leadership’s structural subdivision (the Main Propaganda Centre, abbr. MPC), its separate heads (the head of OUN’s MPC, the executor of Department of political education of the Supreme Military Headquarters (or General Staff, GS), the head of the information bureau of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (USLC) Peter Fedun-“Poltava” (his nom de guerre), the chief of the UPA’s GS Olexa Hasyn-“Lytsar” (“Knight”), and their families (in particular, the family of the head of the OUN Home Leadership, chairman of the General Secretariat of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (USLC) Roman Shukhevych hid itself in the Sambir land); contacts with abroad (the krai bordered Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia); interrelations with the Ukrainians of Bessarabia, Romania, Czechoslovakia; links with the organizational cells in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and – through them – with those in Germany (the Karpatskyi krai was one of

communication bases between the OUN's Leadership in the Ukrainian lands and its Foreign departments).

At the same time, the question concerning the peculiarities of the realization of the Romanian vector of the activity of the OUN's Carpathian area (Karpatskyi krai) remains but insufficiently investigated. Its successful realization was very important not only for the vitality of the underground within the country, but, on the whole, in the all territories of its activity. It is in this context that the necessity of the investigation into this problem is entirely justified.

The organizational units of the Carpathian area of the OUN tried to extend its influence on the territory of the other states neighboring the Soviet Union. So, in particular, the Rakhiv county's leadership (headed by Kyrulo Kravchuk-"Zhubr") had a foreign courier through whom it directed the nationalist literature to Hungary. From the member of the OUN Leadership Roman Kravchuk-"Petro" and through the head of the OUN's Karpatskyi krai leadership S. Slobodian the OUN's Bukovyna district leadership received instructions to contact the Romanian underground and to deliver the report of the situation on the frontier with Romania. On the basis of the deciphered records of S. Slobodian-"Yefrem", the Soviet repression bodies established the following: the communication with the centers abroad (coded as "Ivan") was carried out by special groups of couriers sent from the head of OUN's MPC and the head of the information bureau of the USLC Fedun-"North" through Slavsk and Borynia districts of the former Drohobych region (oblast) (now they are, respectively, Turka and Skole districts of Lviv oblast) to the territories of foreign states. In order to exclude possibilities of failure, these groups should not be directed along the communication lines in operation, but to move by other routes¹.

In 1948–1949, on the instruction of the members of the OUN Leadership, the leader of Zhabie district leadership of the OUN arranged trips of the couriers abroad. This communication line lay from Zhabie district (now Verkhovyna district of Ivano-Frankivsk region) through Rakhiv okruha (now Rakhiv district of the Transcarpathian region) and, further on, through Romania and Hungary into the American zone of occupation of Germany². However, this line was never put in operation. Fulfilling the directives of the regional leadership of the OUN, Yulian Matviiv-"Nedobytyi", the organizational executor of Bukovyna district leadership of

¹ Галузевий державний архів Служби безпеки України (далі – ГДА СБУ), ф. 2-Н, оп. 98 (1954), спр. 1, т. 2, арк. 62; ф. 16, спр. 732, арк. 75.

² ГДА СБУ, ф. 2-Н, оп. 98 (1954), спр. 1, т. 2, арк. 62; ф. 6, спр. 75390фп, т. 1, арк. 234–236; ф. 13, спр. 372, т. 65, арк. 14–15; Т. 66, арк. 186; ф. 65, спр. 9112, т. 8, арк. 196–197.

the OUN (from May, 1948 to July, 1950), and Nazariy Danyliuk-“Perebyinis”, a member of Kolomyia district leadership of the OUN (1946–1951), tried to build the effective line of communication with the underground workers of “Iron Guards” and, also, to recruit holders of communication sites for dispatching of couriers through Romania to Yugoslavia³.

From the evidence (on August, 25th, 1944) of Mykhailo Stepaniak, the head of the external relations executive service of the OUN Home Leadership, we learn that the OUN’s management knew about the mass arrests of “Iron guardsmen” in Romania in the end of 1942, as a result of which a part of them crossed the Romanian-Soviet border and hid themselves in Galicia. The arrests were allegedly connected with the rumors about Khoriy Sim’s, the head of the “Iron guardsmen”, flight from Berlin. Hence, the OUN started seeking to establish the communication with the management of the “Iron guardsmen” as a group which was in opposition to I. Antonescu’s government. The OUN’s administration very accurately understood all the complexities of the negotiations, taking into account the “Iron guardsmen’s” aspiration to restore the influence in Bukovyna territories. Some were inclined even to give up the territory of Bukovyna to the Romanians in exchange for the receipt of arms from them. However, M. Stepaniak did not know precisely whether or not the meeting had taken place⁴.

Lieutenant general Olexandr Voronin, the chief of the Administration of the People’s Commissariat of State Security (APCSS) of Lviv region, wrote about the discovered fact of the negotiations of the representatives of the OUN Leadership with the Romanian government. Among the negotiators he recognized the second vice-president of the USLC Ivan Hryniokh and the representative of the Ukrainian state in Romania (proclaimed in Lviv by the Act of June 30th, 1941,) Hryhoriy Barabash. The negotiations took place in some 150 km from the border in an unknown Romanian town. The Romanian party comprised the representatives of the army and the “Iron guards”, and, allegedly, when the negotiations were coming to an end, a further format of the cooperation was stipulated, but the Romanians unexpectedly interrupted the negotiations, motivating that with the reason, that if the Germans learned about them, they would have occupied Romania in the same way as they had occupied Austria⁵.

During 1943–1944 the OUN Leadership carried out the negotiations with the Romanian power and the Polish underground about the general actions against the

³ ГДА СБУ, ф. 13, спр. 372, т. 47, арк. 214; ф. 2-Н, оп. 99 (1954), спр. 8, т. 3, арк. 243.

⁴ ГДА СБУ, ф. 6, спр. 75135фп, арк. 91–92.

⁵ ГДА СБУ, ф. 13, спр. 372, т. 33, арк. 9.

Red army, which was coming forward with the representatives of the higher Hungarian command. In particular, in autumn of 1943, at the session of the OUN Leadership in the East Ukrainian lands Vasyl Kuk-“Lemish” informed that Tymish Semchysyn-“Richka”, the head of the Transnistria regional leadership of the OUN, got into contact with the representatives of the Romanian governmental circles and carried on the previous negotiations with them. Roman Shukhevych, head of the OUN Home Leadership, supported that initiative and pronounced for the continuation of the negotiations with the purpose of completing a military-political agreement. The members of the OUN Leadership agreed with R. Shuhevych’ opinion, in which the decision was taken, that V. Kuk, together with the USLC foreign affairs secretary general M. Lebid’, should coordinate all the questions connected with the negotiations and to continue them⁶.

Volodymyr Todoriuk-“Tur”, the head of Bukovyna regional leadership of the OUN, and Andriy Maksymenko (Tarasenko)-“Steppe”, the UPA battalion commander, personally negotiated with the Romanians and Hungarians, in which result the latter were obliged to deliver weapons, fighting supplies, clothes, and medicines to the departments of the UPA in the Hutsul Region and Bukovyna in exchange for the combat intelligence. The final agreement between the UPA on the one hand and the command of the Romanian and Hungarian departments on the other hand was signed in June, 1944 (the text of the agreement was translated into the Ukrainian language by Fedir Stefanovych, the director of the UPA’s “Gregit” officer school in Kolomyia land (April–July, 1944). On its conditions, the Hungarians and Romanians were obliged to provide the UPA departments with weapons, ammunition, clothes, and, partially, uniform counting upon 10 000 persons. However, an attempt to fully realize the aforementioned agreement failed as the front line was moved away. The Romanians departed and took their stand on the border of 1939. Since then, the UPA departments started carrying out frequent transitions across the front line, whence they delivered machine guns, rifles, ammunition, and medicines⁷.

Nazariy Danyliuk-“Perebyinis”, the commander of the Bukovyna kurin (battalion) (ovember, 1944 – April, 1945), in his letter to the supreme command, described one more attempt to contact with the Romanians. As a matter of fact, he had established contacts with the Romanian guerrillas and agreed with them upon receiving uniform, arms, and medicines for six companies in exchange of 40 cows. Danyliuk accentuated that there was no problem with getting and transferring of the

⁶ ГДА СБУ, ф. 5, спр. 67418, т. 2, арк. 124.

⁷ ГДА СБУ, ф. 65, спр. с-13422, т. 2, арк. 212.

assigned number of cows, as in territory under his control during the Romanian occupation (1941–1944) no obligatory meat deliveries were effected. “Perebyinis” also noticed that in case of need he and his riflemen could cross to the Romanian territory and to winter there, as for the Romanian guerrilla it made no problem: “... the administration there was Romanian, and the Bolsheviks were only in small garrisons in big centers, the guerrillas were not pursued there and, what is most important, the population was strongly incited against the Bolsheviks and helped the nationalists. I have anticipated that the conditions of our guerrilla struggle will be still more difficult and, therefore, agreed, that in case of necessity I could pass with the troops to the Romanian territory.... Definitively to agree with the Romanian guerrillas, on April 1st, 1945 I had with one company to pass to the major-commander of a group of Romanian guerrillas. To get weapons and uniform made no difficulty at all, as there were several depots yet not occupied by the Bolsheviks. At first, I established communication through the company commander “Boievir”⁸, with whom I had to come to terms. In my opinion, the plan was good and on the brink of being re carried out, but “Steel” discharged me from my territory and my work, did not enquire in the matter and broke the whole plan. In his opinion, this plan of communication was not needed”⁹.

Y. Melnik-“Robert”, chief of Karparskyi krai (the Carpathian area of the OUN) leadership, confirms the contacts between the Ukrainian and the Romanian underground organizations. In particular, at the conference of Karpatskyi krai heads of the OUN on October 22nd, 1945, he noticed that the Romanian underground organization twice tried to establish contacts with the UPA, offering weapons, medicines, and other aid. Moreover, he underlined that many Ukrainian intellectuals from Bukovyna had escaped to Romania and live there¹⁰.

The Romanian vector of the activity of the OUN’s Karpatskyi krai was developed in the context of carrying out of the concept of the national-liberation revolution, in what propaganda raids played a particularly important role. These raids can be defined as fast marches of the UPA departments in the territories not involved into the insurgent movement (both within the country and abroad, – in Belarus, Poland, Slovakia, and Romania) and, also, in the territories under the insurgent movement with special tasks, such as propaganda, sabotages, assassinations, etc.¹¹. Such raids became the most effective method of fulfilling

⁸ Дубик Роман-“Боевір”.

⁹ ГДА СБУ, ф. 65, спр. С-13422, т. 6, арк. 262.

¹⁰ ГДА СБУ, ф.6, спр. 33286фп, арк. 206.

¹¹ Лев Шанковський, *Українська Повстанча Армія, Історія українського війська (1917–1995)*, Львів: Світ (1996), 657.

combat and/or propaganda tasks in the territory where the enemy least expected it¹². The insurgents themselves set out the aims of the raids: to uphold the “national spirit”, to get military-material means, to create the atmosphere of uncertainty and fear in the ranks of the enemy or to challenge it to skirmishes. The UPA departments, which carried out such raids, along with constant exchange of information with the local population, meetings, and rallies, also spread the ideas of liberation struggles, urged the people to enter the ranks of the Ukrainian liberation movement and, at the same time, protected the population from repressions.

As the departments were assigned different tasks before to make their raids, each raid was carefully prepared, the staff with the best moral, business, and intellectual abilities was chosen. The raid’s participants were provided with sets of the best clothes and equipment. Besides, they had to pass not only a military, but also a political training (on the internal and international political situation, learning the program purpose of the OUN’s and UPA’s activity, and the technique of propaganda work with the population, which had a certain subjectivity due to the previous Soviet propaganda). Simultaneously, the propaganda-explanatory material was developed (in the language in use by the population of the locality wherein the department was to go)¹³.

At least 11 transitions of the underground workers from Karpatskyi krai of the OUN into the territory of Romania during 1945–1951, – with different participants, strength, purposes, and productivity, – have been established as facts. Certainly, their actual number could have been more, as this article is grounded only on what has appeared fixed in documents. Actually, the first such raid is mentioned in the evidence (March 8th, 1945) of Olexiy Dodiak-“Kryha”, captain Bukovyna kurin of the UPA (from November, 1944 to February, 1945), who asserted that Dmytro Karapka-“Boyaryn”, staff sergeant of the company commanded by Onufriy Moskaliuk-“Yastrub” (“Hawk”), of the kurin under the command of N. Danylyshyn-“Perebyinis” (in that kurin D. Karapka was by December 15th, 1944) had passed with his platoon to Romania¹⁴.

Yelizar Dariychuk, propagation executive of Putyliv district leadership of the OUN (04.1944–02.1945), political-education officer of Bukovyna kurin (09.1944–

¹² Степан Хмель, *Українська партизанка*, [Б.м.]: Видання Закордонних частин ОУН (1959), 103.

¹³ Центральний державний історичний архів України, м. Львів (далі – ЦДІА України у м. Львів), ф. Р-9, оп. 1, спр. 3, арк. 23в.; Степан Ткаченко, *Повстанческа армия: тактика боротьбы*, Минск: Харвест; М.: АСТ (2000), 269.

¹⁴ Архів управління Служби безпеки України у Чернівецькій області (далі – АУСБУ ЧО), спр. 9973, арк. 47.

1945), on the instructions of Volodymyr Todoriuk-“Tur”, organization executive of Bukovyna regional leadership of the OUN, in the end of 1944 had secretly gone to Romania, purposing to establish a contact with general Kantakuzen’s underground groups¹⁵.

Another fact has been discovered in the secret-service report (on November 17th, 1953) of agent “Vtoryi”, staff sergeant of the kurin of Yulian Matviiv-“Nedobytyi”: in the spring of 1945 staff sergeant “Vpertyi” together with two fighters of his platoon had carried out a cross-border raid at the in the area of mountain Kopylash (which is part of the Marmarosh Massif, located in Verkhovyna district of Ivano-Frankivsk oblast); later, from spring of 1945 to 1948 “Vpertyi” and two other men were hiding in Romania¹⁶.

In May, 1945 Yu. Matviiv-“Nedobytyi” together with Onufriy Moskaliuk-“Yastrub”, platoon commander Dmytro Zhykaliu-“Tverdyi”, sergeant “Khmel”, orderly “Chernyk”, cook “Chornomorets”, orderly “Triska”, medical nurse “Omeliana” and two Security Service men – “Rys” (“Linx”) and “Moroz” (“Frost”) had crossed the frontier with Romania at the area from mountain Chyvchyna to mountain Purul (a massif in the southeast part of the Ukrainian Carpathians in Verkhovyna district of Ivano-Frankivsk region; the mountains are located in the northeast part the Marmarosh Massif). Having stayed in the Romanian territory of till September 21st, 1945, the participants of the raid crossed the frontier with the USSR to and from several times. Guarding against the movement of the border detachments, the groups crossed the border in daytime, at the area from the village of Shybene (now Yavirnyk, in Verkhovyna district of Ivano-Frankivsk region) near mountain Pip Ivan (located on the southeast end of the main mountain ridge of the Chornohora Massif, on the border between Ivano-Frankivsk and Transcarpathian regions) to the Baltahul mountain valley. The underground group had no clashes with the frontier guards. On September 21st, 1945 “Nedoty”, accompanied by “Rys”, “Moroz”, “Chernyk”. “Chornomorets”, and “Omeliana”, came back from Romania into the USSR. The rest of the underground men – “Tverdyi”, “Triska”, “Khmel”, and “Yastrub”, – remained in Romania: of them the first three returned in 1947, and the last stayed in Romania¹⁷.

In June, 1945 the former heads of Bukovyna regional leadership of the OUN M. Kolotylo-“Kobzar” and D. Hyriuk-“Orel” (“Eagle”) sent Stepan Korbashvskyi-

¹⁵ ГДА СБУ, ф. 2, оп. 99 (1954), спр. 6, арк. 235–236.

¹⁶ ГДА СБУ, ф. 13, спр. 372, т. 47, арк. 213.

¹⁷ ГДА СБУ, ф. 2-Н, оп. 99 (1954), спр. 15, арк. 205; оп. 108 (1954), спр. 2, т. 1, арк. 290–291; т. 3, арк. 87–88; ф. 13, спр. 372, т. 43, арк. 193.

“Zalizniak” and Vasyl Vaskan-“Zaporozhian” to debug the communication and to coordinate the work between the dislocated in Bucharest external leadership of the OUN and the OUN’s Home Leadership. During the conversation S. Korbashvskyi informed that “Kobzar” had a contact with the English mission in Bucharest and by his letter asked to send him a person who spoke fluent English. Also, Stepan Korbashvskyi’s task was to fetch “Kobzar” a copy of each OUN’s literary publications edited in Bukovyna by the district leadership of the OUN (by the way, according to C Korbashvskyi, it was already his fourth return from Romania¹⁸)¹⁹. In order to clarify the information on the conditions and relations of the OUN’s underground with the local underground in Romania, Vasyl Savchak-“Stal”, head of Bukovyna district leadership of the OUN (03.1945–06.1950), sent two couriers in the territory of Romania in October²⁰.

UPA soldier Ivan Polenchuk, having legalized his living in 1945, in 1946, together with the head of Kizman district leadership of the OUN Olexandr Fedirchuk-“Taras” (killed in December, 1946 in the Romanian territory), on the instruction of the head of the county leadership of the OUN, went into the territory of Romania, where – by Vasyl Savchak-“Stal’s” order they ought to make contact with Mykhailo Kolotylo-“Kobzar” and Dmytro Hyriuk-“Orel” (“Eagle”), the OUN members in these lands²¹. This information is enriched by the evidence of the propaganda executive of Bukovyna district leadership of the OUN Vasyl Dukhovych (on July 3rd – 7th, 1947), who, in particular, speaks about a transfer of two thousand roubles for the fulfillment of the task, underlining that afterward “Taras” had to return to Bukovyna. In his details about the aforementioned raid Dukhovych mentions his contact with Vasyl Makoviychuk, the resident of the border-zone village of Serhiyi in Putyliv district of Chernihiv oblast, who shortly characterized him the internal political situation in Romania, informed on a possibility to cross the border, and warned of a great number of agents of the Soviet frontier troops which complicated the crossing²².

On July 12th, 1948, on the instruction of the head of Karpatskyi krai leadership of the OUN V. Sydor-“Shelest”, Vasyl Savchak-“Stal” sent four underground workers to Romania, namely “Triska”, “Dubovyi”, “Vlodko”, and “Shuhai”, having given them the task to establish connection with the existing in Romania underground and to pass there the OUN’s leaflet (in the Romanian

¹⁸ ГДА СБУ, ф. 65, спр. с-11868, т. 2, арк. 12.

¹⁹ ГДА СБУ, ф. 13, спр. 372, т. 4, арк. 292; ф. 65, спр. с-11868, т. 2, арк. 16.

²⁰ ГДА СБУ, ф. 13, спр. 398, т. 24, арк. 25–26.

²¹ ГДА СБУ, ф. 2, оп. 99 (1954), спр. 8, т. 1, арк. 143; оп. 34 (1960), спр. 8, арк. 14.

²² ГДА СБУ, ф. 2, оп. 58 (1953), спр. 1, т. 1, арк. 91.

language). “Triska” was appointed the head of this group. Having received the tasks from “Stal”, he led his group along the mountain ridge in the direction of the village of Holoshyno (in Verkhovyna district of Ivano-Frankivsk oblast) and crossed the border with Romania on the mountain valley of Baltahul, – between mountains Pirie and Koman (part of the Marmarosh Massif in the Carpathians), located in the south of Verkhovyna district in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast, to the southeast from the village of Burkut). In the second half of August, 1948, after the fulfillment of the set task, the group came back in the same way. “Triska” told organizational executor of Bukovyna district leadership of the OUN Yulian Matviiv about his raid into Romania. Right after crossing the border, his raiding group went on Romania territory to a wood over a mountain rivulet, which ran into the Vaser, a tributary of the Visheu (Maramures county), and there met with forester Pishta, an acquaintance of his since 1945, and handed him a note written in the German language. Then they met two engineers and had a three-hour conversation with them. “Triska” talked in Ukrainian and “Shuhai” acted as a simultaneous interpreter. During the conversation “Triska” introduced himself as an engineer and participant of OUN underground who had come across the border from the USSR to Romania with a task to establish connection with the local underground. The Romanian engineers confirmed its existence, but did not inform any specifications²³.

Seemingly, in July, 1948, one more group was sent. H. Lehkyi-“Borys”, head of Kolomyia county leadership of the OUN (03.1945–10.1950), gave the task to N. Danyiuk-“Perebyinis”, a member of the aforementioned OUN’s leadership (1946–1951), to go to Romania and to reconnoiter the area and to come into contacts with the local population, to find the reliable persons for the communication with abroad. In July, 1948, the given task was fulfilled by “Perebyinis”, Dmytro Bilinchuk-“Khmara” (“Cloud”), Vasyl Bilinchuk-“Sybiriak” (“The Siberian”), and Ivan Maksymyuk-“Ivanenko” (in his secret-service report, on March 13th, 1952, agent “Taras” refers to the other composition of the raid group: N. Danyiuk-“Perebyinis”, D. Bilinchuk-“Khmara”, V. Bilinchuk-“Sybiriak”, V. Rabeniuk-“Czech”, and I. Debryniuk-“Neporadnyi”²⁴), after getting over Kopylash Mountain (part of the Marmarosh Massif) and back into the territory of Stanislaviv (Ivano-Frankivsk oblast). They spent four days in the territory of Romania. During that time they met with the local population, told about the armed liberation struggle of the Ukrainian

²³ ГДА СБУ, ф. 13, спр. 372, т. 43, арк. 194; ф. 2-Н, оп. 98 (1954), спр. 15, арк. 20; оп. 108 (1954), спр. 2, т. 1, арк. 291.

²⁴ ГДА СБУ, ф. 2, оп. 108 (1954), спр. 2, т. 3, арк. 88.

people, and had conversations on the possibility of acquiring of documents, which task, however, brought to no real effect²⁵.

In the spring of 1949 Pero Melnyk-“Khmara”, the commander of the 21st Tactical Sector “Hutsulshchyna” (“the Hutsul Region”) received a special task from Stepan Slobodian-“Yefrem”, head of Karpatskyi krai leadership of the OUN, (through Hryhoriy Lehkyi-“Borys”, head of Kolomyia county leadership of the OUN), to prepare some 20 skilled and well trained men, to equip all of them in a proper way, to appoint N. Daniliuk-“Perebyinis” (who knew the Romanian language) as the translator and political officer. The group had to make a propaganda raid unto the territory of Romanian People’s Republic, to give talks and organize meetings with the local population, acquainting it with the aims and intentions of the Ukrainian insurgents, with and against whom they fought, and to call the Romanians to struggle against the Bolsheviks, to give them the nationalist leaflets with propaganda texts in the Romanian language, to establish connection with the Romanian underground, and, also, to make contacts with secret address holders for further departures of the OUN couriers through Romania to Yugoslavia²⁶. Among the authenticated participants of that raid the following can be named: 1) Petro Melnyk-“Khmara”, 2) Nazariy Danyliuk-“Perebyinis”, 3) Dmytro Bilinchuk-“Khmara”, 4) Ivan Melnychuk-“Halaida”, 5) Dmytro Iliuk-“Kychera”, 6) Ivan Harhat-“Lypkevych”, 7) Ivan Romaniuk-“Vasyl”, 8) Vasyl Kuziv-“Baz”, 9) Ivan Melnyk-“Zalizniak”, 10) Vasyl Rabeniuk-“Czech”, 11) Vasyl Harhat-“Maxym”, 12) Vasyl Bilinchuk-“Sybiriak”, 13) Ivan Debryniuk-“Neporadnyi”, 14) Ivan Maksymyuk-“Ivanenko”, 15) Dmytry Dovhaniuk-“ Sokil” (“Falcon”), and others²⁷.

Reflecting on the tasks and efficiency of the propaganda raids, Petro Melnyk-“Khmara” wrote this: *“None of the revolutionaries of the peoples that border us was in our territory with the similar mission. Contrarily to that, we were in the territories of all our neighbours many times. This, that is, our propaganda raids and*

²⁵ ГДА СБУ, ф. 2, оп. 99 (1954), спр. 8, т. 3, арк. 243; ф. 5, спр. 67579, т. 1, арк. 172–173.

²⁶ ГДА СБУ, ф. 2-Н, оп. 99 (1954), спр. 8, т. 3, арк. 243; т. 6, арк. 266; оп. 108 (1954), спр. 2, т. 1, арк. 284, 289; Т. 3, арк. 7; ф. 5, спр. 67579, т. 1, арк. 216–218; т. 5, арк. 176; ф. 11, спр. 1433, т. 3, арк. 406–407; ф. 13, спр. 372, т. 47, арк. 214; спр. 376, т. 20, арк. 228зв.; Петро Легкий, *Лицар нескореної України. Розповідь про неохитного провідника Коломийського окружного проводу ОУН-УПА Бориса – Григорія Лежого*, Тернопіль: Джура (2010), 118–119; *Літопис Української Повстанської Армії. Нова серія, т. 10: Життя і боротьба генерала “Тараса Чупринки” (1907–1950)*, Київ–Торонто, (2007), 350.

²⁷ ГДА СБУ, ф. 2-Н, оп. 108 (1954), спр. 2, т. 1, арк. 285; ф. 5, спр. 67579, т. 5, арк. 183–184; ф. 13, спр. 372, т. 47, арк. 219; Віталій Манзуренко, Василь Гуменюк, *Рейд УПА в Румунію 1949 р.*, Львів–Рівне: Бібліотека журналу “Однострій” (2007), 35.

*explanatory work among the neighboring peoples raised the iron curtain for many nations of the world. ... We crossed the border in order to lend a hand to the Romanian revolutionaries and insurgents, to inform them that Ukraine continued struggling and calling them to go into the common struggle*²⁸.

Three days before the raid the raiding group of underground workers met with H. Lehkyi-“Borys”, head of Kolomyia county leadership of the OUN, and his guard. He examined all the members of the group and provided all who had bad footwear and clothes with the new and proper ones²⁹. On the day of their setting off “Borys” again collected the raiding group and outlined the task to be fulfilled.

Carrying out the set task, P. Melnyk-“Khmara” secretly prepared the group, having printed several thousands of leaflets with the text in the Romanian language from the Ukrainian underground to the Romanian peasants, soldiers and officers (“Pentru ce luptă UPA” – “For what the UPA struggles”³⁰, “Tărani, muncitori și intelectuali Români!” – “To the peasants, workers, and intellectuals of Romania”³¹, “Români!” – “You, Romanians”³²). Every member of the insurgent raiding group carried anti-Soviet leaflets in the territory of Romania. Hence, on June 17th, 1949 the group of insurgents under P. Melnyk-“Khmara’s” command set off for a raid from the village of Kosmach in Kosiv district of Ivano-Frankivsk oblast. The route lay through the small town of Verkhovyna, over Stih Mountain, and across the towns of Vishev and Syhit (the border was crossed on the night between June 26th and June 27th, that is, they moved on in the Ukrainian territory during 9 days). In the Romanian territory the group remained for two weeks. Then, on the night from July 9th to July 10th it came back to Ukraine, having crossed the border. In the territory of the USSR the group moved to its disposition place during 17 days, having finished the raid on July 27th. The length of the route in a straight line was almost 120 km, but if to account for the relief, it was nearly 150 km³³. The propaganda raid began in daytime, when in the mountains there was a thick fog, and the group moved to frontier of the USSR with Romania. On the night between June 26th and June 27th the group “Khmary” (“Clouds”) moved to the state border into the territory of Romania³⁴. In the morning group “Clouds” met the Romanian shepherds, guarding

²⁸ ГДА СБУ, ф. 13, спр. 398, т. 20, арк. 980.

²⁹ ГДА СБУ, ф. 5, спр. 67579, т. 5, арк. 176.

³⁰ ГДА СБУ, ф. 13, спр. 376, т. 41, арк. 192.

³¹ ГДА СБУ, ф. 13, спр. 376, т. 41, арк. 223; т. 44, арк. 133.

³² ГДА СБУ, ф. 13, спр. 376, т. 41, арк. 224.

³³ Віталій Манзуренко, Василь Гуменюк, *Рейд УПА в Румунію 1949 р.*, Львів-Рівне: Бібліотека журналу “Однострій” (2007), 19.

³⁴ ГДА СБУ, ф. 13, спр. 372, т. 47, арк. 215; ф. 2-Н, оп. 108 (1954), спр. 2, т. 1, арк. 286.

their sheep in the valley of Hershtul at the foot of Kopylash mountain. From them they learned about the number (6 men) and the route of the frontier squads. Also, the Romanian shepherds shared their food with the Ukrainian insurgents and told them about the safe ways for the further march³⁵.

The group moved along the foreign territory at night. On the third day of its raid through Romania, in the morning, the group came to the house of a forestry engineer in the village of Poliana (Maramures county) and paid a visit to him (the engineer was a Romanian by nationality). “Perebyinis” had arranged the cooperation with him when in a reconnaissance mission on the Romanian territory in the summer of 1948. After the negotiations with “Perebyinis”, the engineer led the group “Clouds” into the woods, and then came back to his home. The next morning the engineer came to the group with two Romanians. They brought food and talked with the “Clouds” for several hours. In the territory of Romania the raiding group managed to visit the following villages: Luh, Poliany, Kryvyi, Ruskyi, Leordina, Rozavlia, Krasnyi, Yeud, Vishev-Nyzhniy, and Vaser. In these villages N. Danyliuk-“Perebyinis” held meetings with the Romanian population and spoke the Romanian language³⁶. The population kindly accepted the group and helped it with food products: *“The population, except for the Bolshevik party servants, treated us very favorably. Our literature gained recognition and popularity. The population in Romania lives very poorly, because the Bolsheviks robbed it blind with the hands of the Romanian secret-service government. However, the Romanian people shared the last crust of bread with us. Their attitude to the Bolsheviks is extremely hostile and they only wait for a change to oppose them”*³⁷. During the group’s trip through the Romanian territory it was constantly accompanied by a local guide (changeable), who knew the locality well, and it was due to him that the group avoided skirmishes with the local force groups. The appearance of the Ukrainian underground group evoked a wide response, therefore, the Soviet soldiers together with the Romanian police checked the suspects in each city, at the railway stations, and in trains³⁸. Unfortunately, P. Melnyk failed to establish contact with the local underground workers as a group of Romanian insurgents had passed into the Marmarosh

³⁵ ГДА СБУ, ф. 13, спр. 372, т. 47, арк. 216; ф. 5, спр. 67579, т. 1, арк. 95–99; Ф. 2, оп. 99 (1954), спр. 8, т. 3, арк. 244.

³⁶ ГДА СБУ, ф. 2-Н, оп. 108 (1954), спр. 2, т. 1, арк. 284, 287, 289; т. 3, арк. 88–89; оп. 99 (1954), спр. 8, т. 3, арк. 243–244; ф. 5, спр. 67579, т. 1, арк. 101; т. 5, арк. 177; ф. 13, спр. 372, т. 47, арк. 220.

³⁷ ГДА СБУ, ф. 2-Н, оп. 108 (1954), спр. 2, т. 1, арк. 287, 289; оп. 99 (1954), спр. 8, т. 3, арк. 243–244; ф. 13, спр. 398, т. 20, арк. 984.

³⁸ ГДА СБУ, ф. 13, спр. 372, т. 47, арк. 217; ф. 5, спр. 67579, т. 5, арк. 155, арк. 171–172.

mountains and ought to have come back in several weeks. The group “Clouds” even intended to go deep into the Romanian territory of Maramures Mountains for an establishment of communication with representatives of Tito’s Yugoslavia. Hence, the activity of Romanian military men, who started organizing round-ups, forced the group to come back into Stanislaviv (Ivano-Frankivsk) oblast³⁹. On their way back the raiding group continued to spread propaganda leaflets in settlements and on pastures. The unit spent 14 days in the Romanian territory, and then again crossed the border and returned in Stanislaviv (Ivano-Frankivsk) oblast.

The head of the raiding group P. Melnyk draws a general conclusion that the Romanians very favourably received them, helped with victuals and the information on the disposition of boundary police and military centers. During its raid the group lived in the Romanian villages, which condition allowed them to continuously conduct propaganda-explanatory work at the earliest opportunity. The prevalent form of this work was gathering of the Romanian peasants, workers, and intelligentsia in separate houses and conduct propaganda conversations with them, first of all – on the liberation struggle against the USSR and creation of the genuine national states. Hence, the participants of such meetings spread the ideas among the Romanian villages, even those in the remote mountain meadows. At the same time, they handed nationalist leaflets and literature in villages⁴⁰. A number of photos from the so-called Yavoriv photo archive allowed the researches to significantly specify and acknowledge the raiding group’s stay in Romania. By the way, these photos, which have miraculously lasted our till our time, give an idea about the features of everyday life in the time of the aforementioned insurgent raid⁴¹.

The raids of the OUN members to Romania took place even at the closing stage of the functioning of Ukrainian liberation movement. In particular, this fact was mentioned by the 1 Administration of the USSR’s Ministry of State Security. On April 30th, 1950 a group of a four OUN members, armed with machine guns and dressed in the military uniform, appeared in the vicinity of the village of Remet (Maramures county). Having specified the name of the area with a shepherd’s help, the group went to the USSR’s frontier. On May 5th, in the area of the village of

³⁹ ГДА СБУ, ф. 2-Н, оп. 108 (1954), спр. 2, т. 1, арк. 285, 286; ф. 5, спр. 67579, т. 1, арк. 95–100; ф. 2, оп. 99 (1954), спр. 8, т. 3, арк. 244; Ф. 13, спр. 372, т. 47, арк. 218; т. 54, арк. 255.

⁴⁰ ГДА СБУ, ф. 13, спр. 398, т. 20, арк. 981–982.

⁴¹ Василь Гуменюк, *Фотограф УПА “Липкевич”*, Український визвольний рух, Львів: Видавництво “Мс”, збірник 1 (2003), 159; Юрій Киричук, *Український національний рух 40–50-х років ХХ століття: ідеологія та практика*, Львів: Добра справа (2003), 143.

Yanosh (Maramures county) a member of the OUN met a local woman and questioned her about Ignat Lobach, the resident of the village of Poliana in Maramures county, and then handed her two brochures, entitled “The Bolshevik democratization of Europe” and “Who are the Banderites and for what they struggle”⁴².

On October 20th, 1951 Nazariy Danyliuk-“Perebyinis” and Vasyl Rabyniuk-“Czech” crossed the Romanian border from Zhabie district (now Verkhovyna district of Ivano-Frankivsk oblast). The cross-border raid was carried out through the existing channel of the OUN’s communication with its foreign centre near Stih Mountain (in the northeast part of Svydivets Massif, located in Rakhiv district of Transcarpathian oblast, at the juncture of 87 and 31 frontier departments)⁴³. The final place of destination of the raid of “Perebyinis” was the territory of Yugoslavia, where he planned to establish contact with the American embassy in Belgrade and to enquire about passing to Canada in order to contact the Ukrainian committee⁴⁴. On the night of October 31st, 1951, during an attempt of the force groups of the Romanian national republic to arrest him, “Perebyinis” was killed, whereas V. Rabyniuk was arrested⁴⁵.

Vasyl Chyzhevskyyu, adjutant of regional UNS commander O. Lutskyi and, later, regional UPA-West commander V. Sydor (07.1943–1944), confirms the contacts between the Ukrainian and the Romanian underground structures in his evidence on May 21st, 1946. In particular, he asserts that the UPA departments, which operated in Bukovyna in 1944–1945, established connection with the Romanian underground armed departments, which even spent some time on Bukovyna’s territory⁴⁶.

In order to support communications with the OUN Home Leadership, delegations were sent from Romania into Karpatskyi krai of the OUN. So, in October, 1945 four couriers from the OUN’s cell in Romania arrived in Ukrainian territory from Bucharest (on October 6th, 1945 the Soviet force groups were informed of their arrival by agent Mykola Trufyn-“Ohoyń”). Two couriers went to Lviv, and the other two – Stepan Korbashvskyi and Hryhoriy Korbashvskyi (father and son) arrived in Bukovyna. After a talk with the couriers, “Stal” appointed Oleh Gandzia-“Vadym” and staff sergeant Mykola Trufyn-“Nalyvaiko” members of a cross-border raiding group (the place of destination was the central site of

⁴² ГДА СБУ, ф. 2, оп. 60 (1953), спр. 3, т. 3, арк. 180.

⁴³ ГДА СБУ, ф. 11, спр. 1434, т. 4, арк. 49.

⁴⁴ ГДА СБУ, ф. 2, оп. 98 (1954), спр. 1, т. 3, арк. 213; оп. 99 (1954), спр. 8, т. 1, арк. 143.

⁴⁵ ГДА СБУ, ф. 2, оп. 99 (1954), спр. 8, т. 1, арк. 175; т. 2, арк. 196–197.

⁴⁶ ГДА СБУ, ф. 6, спр. 33286фп, арк. 264.

communication in the town of Kympulung in Ardzhes county). Their task was to establish a communication site between the foreign mission and the underground on Ukrainian territory. Their raid on the territory of Romania was preliminarily planned to start on October 14th, 1945. According to father and son Korbachevski, the OUN in Romania cooperated with a number of political parties, and it's the OUN leaders there were Dmytro Hyriuk-"Orel" ("Eagle") and Mykhailo Kolotylo-"Kobzar". Having learnt about it, the Soviet security service set agent M. Trufyn the following tasks: 1. closer to get acquainted with the men who were to go abroad; 2. to learn about the place where they had to cross the border; 3. to define the site of communication with the security agents in the Bukovynian territory; 4. to inform of the address in Kympulung (Adzes county) in Romania. However, due to a necessity of the full equipment, the dispatch of the couriers was delayed⁴⁷.

On November 26th agent "Ohon" (Mykola Trufyn-"Nalyvaiko") and Oleh Gandzia-"Vadym" together had to go to Romania, but when people's commissar of internal affairs of the Ukr. SSR (07.1943-01.1946) Vasyl Riasnyi issued the edict that the insurgents could come and confess their guilt, "Vadim" announced of his decision to start living in legal position. This information was positively apprehended by the Soviet security bodies as it widened the possibilities of his use abroad. The couriers, who were sent to Romania, were assigned the following basic tasks: 1. to establish connections with the M. Kolotylo-"Kobzar", D. Hyriuk-"Orel", and other former members of the OUN; 2. to find out the OUN's position in Romania; 3. to count up the number of political parties, their structures, forms of activity, and their attitudes to the OUN; 4. to study the position of the official government towards the OUN; 5. to establish the OUN's connection with the legionaries; 6. to purchase in Romania a typewriter, printing paper, and paints for stencil printing; 7. to inform the OUN leadership in Romanian territory on the scales of the OUN's activities in Bukovyna. The group ought to come back by January 15th, 1946. However, neither of the couriers was ever sent into Romania, whereas agent Mykola Trufyn-"Ohon" was sent by the security bodies into Vyzhnytsia district to work out the OUN's communications there.

The raids in the territory of Karpatskyi krai become more intensive in connection with the 1947 Action "Visla" ("Vistula", Polish: "Wisla"). So, referring to a reference (dd. November, 1948), of administration 2-N of the MSS of the Ukr.SSR, O. Ishchuk and N. Nikolaieva in their research cite the data that in 1947-1948 103 illegal crossings of the border of the USSR from the territories of Poland (517 persons), Czechoslovakia (8 persons), Hungary (4 persons), and Romania (11

⁴⁷ ГДА СБУ, ф. 65, спр. с-13422, т. 4, арк. 78.

persons) took place, that is, 540 persons all in all (in 1947 there were 83 cases of crossing the border by 510 persons on the whole, in 1948 there were 20 such cases and 30 persons involved in them)⁴⁸. From among these cases no less than 30 included fighting groups of the OUN and UPA, totalling at least 435 persons, underground activists of the OUN (couriers and emissaries), totalling 66 persons, four Polish underground activists, 14 foreign secret service agents, and 21 other persons. 191 persons, who were illegally crossing the border, were killed or detained by the organs of the Ukr.SSR's MSS, including 130 UOA Riflemen, 34 OUN members, 2 Polish underground activists, 10 foreign secret service agents, and 15 other persons⁴⁹. In 1946–1948 (by November 1st, 1948) 41 OUN couriers came from abroad, of which 2 in 1946, 32 in 1947, and 7 in 1948. Of 41 sent across the border, 2 were killed in 1947 and 35 were arrested (1 in 1946, 16 in 1947, 18 in 1948), 4 were under examination⁵⁰.

Thus, during the 1940s and in the beginning of the 1950s the Ukrainian and the Romanian underground structures made intensive attempts to come into contact. Certainly, not all arrangements and set tasks were carried out full measure, but even that proved a practical productivity of these attempts and even that partially realization of what had been planned allows the researchers to confirm the importance of the Romanian vector activity of the Carpathian area (alias Karpatskyi krai) of the OUN. By today over ten propaganda raids (with returns) of the OUN members to the territory of Romania and several cases of crossing the border by the members of the OUN network from Romania to the Ukrainian lands have been possible to find out. Despite the lack of details about the common struggle of the Ukrainian and Romanian anti-Communist structures (though the individual participation – of several Romanians in Karpatskyi krai underground – is undeniable), the mutual recognition and understanding of the necessity of the common struggle was certified by the very fact of their negotiations, arrangements, exchanges of materials, products, and information. Besides, it should be underlined, that, contrary to all complexities, Ukrainian national liberation movement managed to refute the myths created by the Soviet ideological-propaganda machine, to impart to the population of the neighboring countries (for example, Romania) the necessity

⁴⁸ Олександр Ішук, Наталія Ніколаєва, *Кур'єрський зв'язок між закордонними частинами ОУН та підпіллям ОУН і УПА в Україні в 1944–1955 роках*, Воєнна історія, 2010, № 1 (49), 57.

⁴⁹ Олександр Ішук, Наталія Ніколаєва, *Кур'єрський зв'язок між закордонними частинами ОУН та підпіллям ОУН і УПА в Україні в 1944–1955 роках*, Воєнна історія, 2010, № 1 (49), 58.

⁵⁰ ГДА СБУ, ф. 13, спр. 372, т. 42, арк. 347; т. 77, арк. 45.

and, moreover, the possibility of serious resistance, so vividly acknowledged by a long-term activity of the Ukrainian nationalist underground. As can be concluded, these are the reasons that pushed for expansion of the Resistance movement against the Soviet totalitarian system in the countries of central and eastern Europe.