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STOCKS OF COMMERCIAL BREAD IN UKRAINE IN THE SPRING OF 1918 IN THE ASSESSMENT OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF GERMANY AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

– Abstract –

The purpose of the article is to show how the governments of Austria-Hungary and Germany, negotiating with the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic on grain supplies (March-April 1918), determined its quantity in Ukraine.

The scientific novelty is seen in the fact that for the first time the above mentioned topic is considered in a special study.

During the trade negotiations in Kyiv (March-April 1918), representatives of the Central Powers, not having accurate data on the amount of marketable grain in Ukraine, determined it approximately based on general considerations and their own impressions from the inspection of Ukrainian farms. Peasants were the main owners of grain in Ukraine in early 1918 – during the war years (1914-1917) and they had accumulated significant reserves and were unable to fully spend them (sell or consume). Taking this fact into account, German and Austro-Hungarian experts assumed the possibility to purchase at least one million tons of grain from villages. They considered the assessment of Ukraine's export potential made earlier during the peace negotiations between the UPR and the Central Powers in Brest-Litovsk (February 1918).

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FORMULATION OF THE ISSUE

In February 1918, at the Brest-Litovsk diplomatic conference, Ukraine and the Central Powers agreed to restore trade relations interrupted during the World War I. According to these agreements, Ukraine had until 31st of July, 1918 to sell surplus grain (not needed for domestic consumption) to the Central Powers. After discussing the export potential of Ukraine, the parties agreed that at least one million tons could be put up for sale. Details of supplies – stages, price, form of payment – were to be determined at the next trade negotiations in Kyiv.

However, at these negotiations, which began at the end of March 1918, the main topic suddenly became not the organization of supplies, but again, as at the conference in Brest-Litovsk, the very ability of Ukraine to export grain. At a meeting on 28th of March, 1918, Ukrainian officials stated that there were not a million tons of surplus bread suitable for export in the Ukrainian People's Republic, but at most 650,000. German and Austro-Hungarian delegates denied this. In the end, the Ukrainian government changed its mind again: at the beginning of April 1918, its representatives announced that Ukraine would still provide the Central Powers with one million tons of grain by August.

So how much surplus grain, according to Austro-Hungarian and German experts, did Ukraine have at the beginning of 1918? And how – on the basis of what data – did they identify this number?

ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS

These issues have not been considered in the historical literature before. There is information about the course and results of trade negotiations between the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Central Powers (1918) in

the works of O. Anderson, P. Borovsky, P. Hai-Nyzhnyk, K. Milov, P. Prytuliak¹ and other researchers. Their writings refer to the dispute between the governments of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Central Powers regarding the amount of grain that Ukraine was supposed to supply. But the question of how the parties "arrived" at the disputed figures remained outside the attention of scientists.

The purpose of the study is to find out how the German and Austro-Hungarian governments during trade negotiations with the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic (March – April 1918) determined the amount of commercial grain available in Ukraine.

PRESENTING THE MAIN MATERIAL

When negotiating in Brest-Litovsk about the export of grain from Ukraine, the German and Austro-Hungarian experts did not even know approximately what its export capacity was then.

It was known that before the World War I – in 1909-1913 – the Russian Empire produced an average of 59 million tons of grain annually (3,546.7 million poods – 2,219.7 wheat and rye, 1,327 oats and barley), with of which approximately 10 million tons (592.2 million poods – 298.8 wheat and rye, 293.4 oats and barley) were sold abroad². During this period, Ukrainian governorates within the Russian Empire annually produced more than 19 million tons of grain (1.2 billion poods). Of these, roughly 5.5 million tons (340 million poods), according to German experts, were surpluses unnecessary for domestic consumption. They were almost entirely

¹ О. Андерсон, *Внешняя торговля Украины в 1918 году*, Издательство Всероссийского центрального союза потребительных обществ, Киев, 1919, pp. 11-71; Павло Гай-Нижник, *Україна: фінанси і політика (1917-1922 рр.)*, Саміт-книга, Київ, 2021, pp. 421-455; Павло Пригуляк, *Україна і Брестський мир: від підписання до виконання (1917-1918 рр.)*, Київський національний торговельно-економічний університет, Київ, 2004, pp. 83-114; Peter Borowsky, *Deutsche Ukrainepolitik 1918 (unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Wirtschaftsfragen)*, Mathiesen Verlag, Lübeck; Hamburg, 1970, pp. 92-107; Caroline Milow, *Die ukrainische Frage 1917-1923 im Spannungsfeld der europäischen Diplomatie*, Harrassowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden, 2002, pp. 124-136.

² Wladimir Wolf Kaplun-Kogan (ed.), *Russisches Wirtschaftsleben seit der Herrschaft der Bolschewiki nach russischen Zeitungen*, Verlag von B.G. Teubner, Leipzig, Berlin, 1919, pp. 231-232.

(4.9 million tons or 300 million poods) exported, accounting for half of the empire's total exports³.

The economic advisors of the governments of the Central Powers, advising them during the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk, took into account that the agriculture of the Russian Empire, in particular its Ukrainian governorates, could not fail to suffer losses during the war. The negative impact, they assumed, was due to a complex of factors: conscription of a large part of workers, requisition of horses and livestock, lack of agricultural tools and fertilizers, liquidation of land ownership of subjects of the Central Powers and "enemy natives", primarily German colonists⁴.

As for the last factor, characterizing the consequences of the tsarist government's measures to limit German land ownership (the liquidation laws of 1915), the German financial expert Rudolf Klaus noted: "The total area of land to be liquidated reached 3.2 million desiatins and included the most cultural farms. The sown area on these lands was sharply reduced, because the colonists did not plant crops, the harvest of which could no longer be collected by them. The Kherson zemstvo expressed fears that this extremely rich region may need to import bread if the lands of the colonists are not sown"⁵.

However, noting the presence of crisis phenomena in the economy of the Russian Empire and the related reduction in export potential, German experts could not correctly assess their scale, because they did not have the necessary information. "The figures that appeared during the war vary widely and often contradict each other; in some cases, in order to reassure the population, incorrect figures were published in advance", R. Klaus wrote, noting that serious errors were inherent in Russian agricultural statistics even in peacetime⁶.

³ Вольфрам Дорнік (упор.), *Україна між самовизначенням та окупацією: 1917-1922 роки*, Ніка-Центр, Київ, 2015, р. 266; Claus Remer, *Die Ukraine im Blickfeld deutscher Interessen. Ende des 19 Jahrhunderts bis 1917/18*, Verlag von Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, New York, Paris, Wien, 1997, р. 89.

⁴ Рудольф Клаус, *Война и народное хозяйство России (1914-1917 гг.)*, Ленинград: Государственное военное издательство, Москва, 1926, р. 99.

⁵ Ibidem, р. 101.

⁶ Ibidem, pp. 101-102.

However, German and Austro-Hungarian experts believed that the lack of reliable information about the state of agricultural production in the Russian Empire during the war years was not very important left, because there was an irrefutable fact that allowed us to be sure of the existence of a significant amount of surplus grain on the territory of the empire, in particular, in its Ukrainian governorates. This fact was the cessation of food exports during the war period. In the absence of export abroad, Ukraine should have accumulated a stock of 20 million tons of grain (5 million tons each from four harvests – 1914, 1915, 1916 and 1917). That is, no matter how significant the drop in production was, one million tons of excess grain – suitable for export to the Central Powers – Ukraine at the beginning of 1918, according to these hypothetical calculations, definitely did not have.

Having arrived in Ukraine after the conclusion of the peace treaty in Brest-Litovsk, the German representatives were able to study the food situation on the ground. The material for this was provided by conversations with Ukrainian officials, experts, agricultural producers and traders, analysis of professional publications (in particular, articles in periodicals that representatives of the Central Powers in Ukraine and Russia carefully read, compiled reviews⁷ and collections⁸), visits to estates and peasant farms.

The allies hoped to finally get an accurate estimate of the amount of marketable bread available in Ukraine from Ukrainian experts, but this turned out to be impossible. The fact was that as of the beginning of 1918, almost all the grain in Ukraine was in the hiding places of the peasants. They owned grain that they grew on their own farms, as well as grain that they received from landowners as workers on their estates (it accounted for about a third of the production of the estates), and grain that they acquired illegally as participants in pogroms and robberies during the riots on the border of 1917 and 1918. Peasants carefully hid their own grain, and even more appropriated another's grain (captured from looted estates, state and private warehouses): "they hid it, as is customary in Ukraine, in large depressions in the ground",

⁷ The Central State Archive of Higher Authorities and Administration of Ukraine. Fund 2601. List 1. Files 5 & 6.

⁸ Wladimir Wolf Kaplun-Kogan (ed.), *Russisches Wirtschaftsleben seit der Herrschaft der Bolschewiki nach russischen Zeitungen*, Verlag von B.G. Teubner, Leipzig, Berlin, 1919.

General Wilhelm Grener, chief of staff of the German group of troops in Ukraine, wrote in his memoirs⁹. That is why the grain available in Ukraine in the spring of 1918 – scattered over a large number of farms and carefully hidden – was not accounted for.

Since the calculation of reserves was not carried out, the allies again, as during the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk, had to rely on general considerations. A direct study of the state of affairs in the agricultural sector of Ukraine showed that the hopes of the governments of the Central Powers to find a large amount of grain in Ukraine were overestimated. As it became clear, German and Austro-Hungarian experts made several important mistakes while determining the degree of Ukraine's export capacity during the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk.

First, these experts underestimated the level of decline in agricultural productivity in the Russian Empire during the war years. Caused by a number of reasons, in particular, the military mobilization of the peasants, the decrease in production was actually not moderate, but very significant. Thus, according to the economic columnist of the newspaper "Nashe Slovo", organ of the Russian Constitutional Democratic Party (May 1918), during 1914-1917, the annual harvest of wheat, rye, oats and barley in the Russian Empire amounted to an average of 3,013.4 billion of poods, i.e., compared to the pre-war harvesting, decreased by 15%¹⁰. According to the information provided to the German side by the Bolshevik government, on average, in 1916 and 1917, grain collection in the governorates of the European part of the Russian Empire, compared to the pre-war period, decreased even more – by 20%, in some places even by 40%¹¹.

Secondly, German and Austro-Hungarian experts, taking into account the lack of exports from the Russian Empire during the World War, underestimated the growth of domestic consumption. After all, in wartime, a new large consumer of food appeared in the Russian Empire – the army

⁹ Wilhelm Groener, *Lebenserinnerungen. Jugend. Generalstab. Weltkrieg*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1957, pp. 390-391.

¹⁰ Kaplun-Kogan, *op.cit.*, p. 231.

¹¹ С. Дернберг и др. (ред.), *Советско-германские отношения от переговоров в Брест-Литовске до подписания Рапальского договора. Сборник документов. Т. 1. (1917-1918 гг.)*, Политиздат, Москва, 1968, p. 526.

increased by mobilization. This consumer spent a significant part of the surplus that was formed as a result of the reduction of exports outside the empire.

At the meeting of the Russian-German commission on the restoration of economic relations on 15th of May, 1918, the Russian representative Mechislav Bronsky expressed this reasoning, which is valid not only for Russia, but also for Ukraine: “True, during... the war, normal exports were suspended, and it is thought that these huge unexported masses of foodstuffs are hidden.... The war [however] created quite a peculiar conjuncture for agriculture. The internal market, which before the war was not able to absorb all the products, as a result of the war showed a much greater capacity. The army, which consisted of millions of hungry peasants, became for the agriculture a reliable, powerful market for selling products at a good price. If we remember that the export of rye in 1913 was only 3%, barley – 4%, oats 5% and the export of wheat – 20% of our annual profit, it is easy to imagine that with a strong increase in demand on our domestic market, none accumulation of products that were previously exported is out of the question. On the contrary, not only these products were eaten, but even the purchases made by the intendancy posed a threat to the former consumers inside the country. The needs of our army in oats and rye are known significantly exceeded the amount of this product that was previously exported; the same situation [occurred] with regard to meat, butter, etc.”¹².

In addition to the army, cities became another powerful consumer due to the influx of refugees. For example, in the spring of 1918, according to German and Austro-Hungarian observers, 800,000 people lived in Odesa¹³ – “almost twice as many as before the war”¹⁴. According to the Austro-

¹² Ibidem, pp. 526-527.

¹³ Alfred Krauss, Franz Klingenbrunner, *Die Besetzung der Ukraine 1918. Militärverwaltung in den von den österreichisch-ungarischen Truppen besetzten Gebieten*, Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Wien, 1928, p. 378; Albert Hopman (aut.), Michael Epkenhans (ed.), *Das ereignisreiche Leben eines “Wilhelminers”*. *Tagebücher, Briefe, Aufzeichnungen 1901 bis 1920*, B. Oldenbourg Verlag, München, 2004, p. 1092.

¹⁴ Krauss & Klingenbrunner, *op.cit.*, p. 378.

Hungarian observer, the population of Kyiv was the same (800,000 people) – “about 300,000 more than in peacetime”¹⁵.

Finally, a significant part of the grain that was not exported was consumed by the producers themselves. Before the war, peasants in the Russian Empire, including residents of Ukrainian villages, in order to cover their expenses (primarily, to pay taxes), had to sell almost all the grain grown to exporters, leaving a minimum for sowing and food. During the war period, when exporters did not buy grain, the peasants had the opportunity to eat better, and could also increase the number of poultry and livestock, because they now had additional feed for them. The columnist of the newspaper “Nashe Slovo” noted in this regard (29th of May, 1918): “The improvement of the nutrition of the rural population... is confirmed by many observations. ...It should also be mentioned that the total number of livestock in the countryside did not decrease during the war years as a result of the surplus of grain in the peasant farms; the livestock count in 1916 even showed an increase of 15-16%, regardless of mobilization and requisitions”¹⁶.

Assessing the prospects of food exports from Ukraine at the beginning of 1918 and hoping that it would happen quickly, German specialists underestimated the uneven distribution of grain stocks across the country (although they knew about it¹⁷). “They overlooked that the western part of Ukraine, the densely populated Volyn, Podillia, Kyiv, and even Poltava governorates, which were to be the first to be occupied by the troops of the Central Powers, could immediately produce much less export grain than the eastern and southern governorates, especially Kherson and Katerynoslav, [as well as] Kharkiv, Tavria ones, so that for this reason alone, to obtain 1 million tons of the [new] crop from what was available in western Ukraine, which was also the supply base for the large Russian Southwestern Army [that is, the Russian Southwestern Front], was an unrealized thing”, the German economist Bernhard Troyenfels wrote¹⁸.

¹⁵ Theophil Hornykiewicz, *Ereignisse in der Ukraine 1914-1922, deren Bedeutung und historische Hintergründe*, Bd. 1, Philadelphia, 1966, p. 335.

¹⁶ Kaplun-Kogan, *op.cit.*, p. 233.

¹⁷ Дернберг и др., *op.cit.*, p. 281.

¹⁸ Bernhard Treuenfels, *Die Reste der russischen Volkswirtschaft*, Verlag von Ferdinand Enke, Stuttgart, 1920, p. 45.

Therefore, the reserves of export grain in Ukraine at the beginning of 1918 were not as large as expected. However, those stocks that were accumulated during 1914-1917, on the border of 1917/1918, were significantly reduced for several reasons. Firstly, during the struggle between the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Bolsheviks in the conditions of social disorder that accompanied this struggle, a large part of the grain, concentrated in state and private warehouses, was destroyed or looted. Secondly, the food policy of the Bolsheviks was revealed. During their rule and during the retreat from Ukraine, as the Austrian State Secretary for Food Supply Hans Löwenfeld-Russ noted in his memoirs, "partially destroyed the supplies, partially took them with them"¹⁹. For example, only between 19th and 26th of January, 1918, according to the Ukrainian People's Republic's government, 363 wagons with food were sent to Petrograd from Ukraine²⁰.

Thirdly, the Central Powers' own troops, sent to Ukraine in accordance with the agreements to provide it with military assistance in the fight against the Bolsheviks, consumed a significant amount of food. Already at the beginning of this military action (February 1918), the leaders of the Central Powers understood that, according to the expression of General Ottokar Landwehr, one of the Austro-Hungarian leaders responsible for food supply, "the troops had to live first of all themselves", therefore, they had to spend the acquired eat to satisfy "the beginning of one's own needs"²¹. The Austro-Hungarian and German troops in the Ukrainian People's Republic were numerically smaller than the former Russian ones – it was no longer about millions of soldiers – but it was still a large community that consumed a lot of food. A soldier's monthly ration included 75 pounds of bread, 60 pounds of meat, and 9 pounds of sugar. 400,000 head of cattle (in terms of large

¹⁹ Hans Loewenfeld-Russ (aut.), Isabella Ackerl (ed.), *Im Kampf gegen Hunger. Aus Erinnerungen des Staatssekretär für Volksernährung 1918-1920*, Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Wien, 1986, p. 91.

²⁰ Пригуляк, *op.cit.*, p. 77.

²¹ Ottokar Landwehr, *Hunger. Die Erschöpfungsjahre der Mittelmächte 1917/18*, Amalthea-Verlag, Zürich, Leipzig, Wien, 1931, p. 197.

cattle)²² were consumed in Ukraine for meat only ten months after the start of the offensive.

Thus, the conclusions regarding the export potential of Ukraine made by the German and Austro-Hungarian representatives in the Ukrainian People's Republic in the spring of 1918 were disappointing: as it turned out, little grain had been grown in Ukraine in recent years, and what was grown, as of the beginning of 1918 year had already been spent to a large extent – one part was consumed by the population and the army, the other part was taken to Russia by the Bolsheviks.

Perhaps, given these circumstances, the governments of the Central Powers should have given up on trying to get a million tons of grain from Ukraine – to take as much as they could harvest, and not demand more from the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic?

However, the leaders of the Central Powers believed that the export potential of Ukraine (in particular, its front-line regions) was inferior to pre-war indicators, but still remained high. It was still possible to buy a million tons on Ukrainian territory, experts and officials who arrived in Kyiv for participation in trade negotiations thought, – to buy from the peasants.

Several considerations led German and Austro-Hungarian experts to the conclusion that there must have been a lot of grain in the peasants' hiding places. No matter how much the peasants increased their own consumption, they still could not eat, feed livestock, or process into vodka the entire multimillion amount of grain. The sale of products in the cities was limited by the fact that the peasants did not need cash. During the war years, selling food to the townspeople, they accumulated large amounts of paper money and could not spend it, because the production of household goods then almost stopped (the industry of Ukraine and Russia during the war worked for the needs of the front). "Judging by everything, the peasant, since he robbed the landowners in December, January, February, must have quite a lot of grain, because he could not, in the end, use it all to make schnapps, and the urban population, which in places, such as, for example, in Kyiv, has extreme difficulty with flour, also has not used [everything] either. However, I believe

²² Юрий Белан, *Отечественная война украинского народа против немецких оккупантов в 1918 году*, Издательство Киевского университета, Киев, 1960, p. 174.

that the optimistic hopes that we had at home must be reduced here, because considering the masses of grain available for harvesting... modest numbers should be counted on. Sometimes you also have to listen to stories about the senseless destruction of grain, which in any case is quite probable, but in general does not mean the disappearance of a large mass [of grain]”, one of his subordinates reported to General Landwehr from Kyiv (24th of March, 1918)²³.

It was also necessary to take into account that the peasants had to protect their stocks, because they hoped to get very rich from them in the near future. Knowing well that no one had grain in the country except for them, the peasants, according to Admiral Albert Hopman, head of the Navigation and Technical Commission in Odesa, “not without reason predicted an imminent famine”²⁴, that is, they counted on the fact that soon, when the urban population there will be an acute shortage of food, they will be able to sell the stored food at a high price – and then the jewels from the cities will flow into their pockets.

Observing their lives convinced that the villages had large reserves of grain. Most of the peasants, it seemed, were not rich, but they were not poor either. Thus, Rittmaster Bennigsen, an officer of the 14th hussar regiment, describing the life of the rural population of northern Ukraine in his memoirs, emphasized a fairly high level of prosperity. As it follows from his story, the owners of small farms saved on everything they could (for example, instead of expensive firewood and coal, they heated their homes with sun-dried manure and sunflower tops), but they had enough for what they needed – in particular, good food. Bennigsen mentioned in his story borscht [Borschtsuppe] – “the main and favourite dinner dish”, which “consisted of sheets of white cabbage, pork and potatoes boiled together”, and tea on water heated in a samovar [Kipitoek, Samowar]²⁵.

²³ Hornykiewicz, *op.cit.*, p. 335.

²⁴ Hopman & Epkenhans, *op.cit.*, p. 1094.

²⁵ Curt von Ulrich, *Das Husaren-Regiment Landgraf Friedrich II von Hessen-Homburg (2 Kurhessisches) № 14. 1706-1919. Nach den Kriegsakten des Regiments, Kriegstagebüchern und anderen Quellen*, Druck und Verlag von Gerhardt Stalling, Oldenburg, 1933, pp. 239-240.

And Colin Ross, a German writer and traveller, a liaison officer between the German diplomatic service and the military command in Ukraine, in his report to the command of the German Eastern Front in March 1918 noted: “According to the residents, there are large stocks of grain hidden everywhere in the villages and buried in the ground. It is difficult to say how true this message is, but it seems to me that it is. During my visits to many villages, I saw that the peasants live extremely well, they have a lot of small livestock, and they offer a large amount of lard, their national dish”²⁶.

In general, Ukraine, despite the long-term war troubles, appeared to foreigners as a prosperous country. K. Ross wrote: “Ukraine creates the impression of a country that lacks nothing. Even in cities with a clearly poor supply, even in Kyiv, which is experiencing such difficulties, you can see all kinds of life products in unlimited quantities in shops and hotels. The only food product, the lack of which is felt in the cities, is bread, since the peasants do not take bread to the city. But meat can be found everywhere in any quantity”²⁷.

However, there seemed to be enough bread too – at least outside the big cities. The command of the Austro-Hungarian 2nd Army reported shortly after the occupation of Odesa (March 13, 1918): “A lot of grain is stored in the vicinity of Odessa”. The author of another Austro-Hungarian report, concluded at the beginning of the 20s of March 1918, stated: in the country as a whole, “supplies are undoubtedly in large quantities”²⁸.

So, the representatives of the Central Powers in Ukraine and their leaders in Vienna and Berlin were inclined to think that export grain in the Ukrainian state was sufficient to fulfil the agreements reached at the Brest-Litovsk Conference – it was impossible to identify the exact amount, but, in their opinion, this amount probably exceeded one million tons. Exporting from Ukraine, Austro-Hungarian and German officials believed in the spring of 1918, would be a difficult task, but not because of a lack of grain suitable for export, but for other reasons, including the general devastation, the

²⁶ Колин Росс, *Доклад начальнику Операционного отделения германского Восточного фронта о положении дел в Украине в марте 1918 года*, “Архив русской революции”, Терра, Москва, 1991, Т. 1, р. 291.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, р. 291.

²⁸ Krauss & Klingensbrunner, *op.cit.*, pp. 368-369.

administrative incapacity of the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic, difficulties with the organization of procurement (it was unclear how to motivate peasants to sell grain, because they were not interested in paper money) and transport challenges.

Expressing this opinion shortly after the start of the German military operation in support of the Ukrainian People's Republic government and after the first experience of grain procurement, Prince Leopold of Bavaria, Commander-in-Chief of the German Eastern Front, wrote in his diary on 26th of February, 1918: "The supply had, however, its difficulties. Grain was probably available in sufficient quantity, but it was mostly hidden and was not supplied satisfactorily; the transport material was also unsatisfactory; the government in Kyiv did not have the strength to implement its orders. The Bolsheviks [Bolschewisten] carried out their terror throughout the country, everywhere [everything] was beaten and robbed"²⁹.

CONCLUSIONS

When agreeing terms of trade between Ukraine and the Central Powers at the beginning of 1918, their governments did not have the opportunity to use accurate data on the export potential of Ukraine – there were no reliable statistics. Based on general considerations (that the peasants – the main owners of grain in Ukraine at the beginning of 1918 – could not fully use up its reserves, accumulated during the previous four years), and on their own observations of the state of peasant households (as it seemed, well-provided, mostly quite wealthy), the representatives of the Central Powers in the Ukrainian People's Republic made assumptions about the presence of a considerable amount of food in the villages. Therefore, the volume of grain exports from Ukraine to the Central Powers determined at the diplomatic conference in Brest-Litovsk in February 1918 – one million tons by 31st of July, 1918 – was recognized as realistic and confirmed at the trade negotiations in Kyiv in March-April 1918.

²⁹ Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Geheime Hausarchiv, Nachlass Prinz Leopold von Bayern. 239/1. S. 1149, 1150.

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